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Rempt: President’s Forum

Rear Admiral Rempt is a 1966 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy. Initial assignments included deployments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9) and
USS Somers (DDG 34). He later commanded USS
Antelope (PG 86), USS Callaghan (DDG 994), and
USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). Among his shore assignments were the Naval Sea Systems Command as the initial project officer for the Mark 41 Vertical Launch
System; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff as the
Aegis Weapon System program coordinator; director of
the Prospective Commanding Officer/Executive Officer
Department, Surface Warfare Officers Schools Command; and Director, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements
Division (OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral
Rempt also served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, where he initiated development of Naval
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, continuing those efforts as Director, Theater Air Defense on the CNO’s
staff. More recently, he was Program Executive Officer,
Theater Air Defense, the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Theater Combat Systems, the first
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense,
and Director, Surface Warfare (N76) on the CNO’s
staff. Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as the
forty-eighth President of the Naval War College on 22
August 2001.
He holds master’s degrees in systems analysis from
Stanford University and in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College.
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As I have noted in the past, the Naval War College has two primary
missions: to educate future leaders and to define future forces.

I discussed the efforts now
under way in Newport to help define future courses that our Navy
could follow to transform itself to meet more effectively the demands of the new century. The strategic landscape has been
changed by many factors: political, economic, and technological.
How the service responds to these changes is critical to our continued contribution to national security.
The Navy Vision Project has engaged faculty, staff, and defense experts from
around the nation in a series of workshops and study groups. Collectively, these
visionaries have identified six major options in which additional investment
could be made. Each would define a different Navy than the one we have today.
However, a fundamental truth underpins all potential decisions: the Navy of tomorrow will be derived largely from the Navy of today. Necessary changes will be
made incrementally over a number of years, and the amount of resources that
can be applied to “recapitalization” will, realistically, be on the order of 10 percent to 15 percent of the Navy’s research and procurement budgets. By a huge
margin, the greatest portion of budget expenditures each year will go to maintaining and operating ships, aircraft, and weapons systems now in inventory and
to recruiting, training, and retaining our great sailors. These expenditures are
essential to enable us to continue to meet the demands of the Terror War.
Our challenge as a maritime service is to apply skillfully the relatively small
discretionary portion of the budget so as to get maximum impact on future capabilities. Just as in navigating aboard ship, when a few degrees of change in base
course can result in hundreds or thousands of miles of difference in the ultimate
destination, the Navy Vision Project is working to provide possible “midcourse
corrections” to the Navy’s future track, to move toward the most effective Navy
for our nation.
IN A PREVIOUS ISSUE OF THE REVIEW,
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SIX OPTIONS
For over two hundred years the Navy has provided America’s leaders a balanced
force capable of accomplishing a wide variety of missions across the entire spectrum of conflict, from such low-cost and low-risk activities as evacuation of
noncombatants from areas of potential conflict to the full-scale engagement of
an enemy with weapons of mass destruction. This high degree of flexibility will
be even more valuable in the future. Naval forces provide national freedom of
action for the application of military power in an increasingly uncertain and
complex world. To be most effective, our naval forces should be tailored and
focused to meet the most likely scenarios. The Navy could focus its investment
or change its strategic direction by taking the following courses:
Lead Revitalized Maritime Security. This option strengthens the nation’s maritime shield by revitalizing the full range of capabilities that provide “maritime
defense in depth.” The underlying assumption driving this option is that, unlike
many wars of the past century in
which conflict took place far from
The Navy would enhance its capabilities to
U.S. shores, it is increasingly likely
provide missile defense of the United States,
and of allies and forces around the world. This that future battles could take place
near or on U.S. territory. A major
option assumes that additional and substantial attacks on targets within the United States focus of the maritime security
emphasis would be on the screenare likely, if not inevitable.
ing and control of seaborne commerce. This includes merchant ships, containers, and superports, as well as
maritime companies and their finances. Success in this endeavor would require
a sophisticated and robust information collection and dissemination network
and the establishment of the ability to intercept and interdict incoming threats
from forward overseas and close to U.S. shores. Procurement of ships sized to
meet specific needs, between the capabilities of Coast Guard cutters and
multimission Navy destroyers, would be necessary. This capability would also
enable the United States and its allies to conduct preventive operations against
groups, states, and nonstate actors deemed to represent a threat to U.S.
security.
Expand Sea-Basing. The key to sustained combat operations has always been the
logistical support of the engaged forces. The Navy’s historical ability to operate
for extended periods at sea is well recognized, and this capability could be
expanded to provide joint and combined force commanders with the ability to
commence military operations from secure offshore “sea bases.” This option is
predicated on the assumption that for political and economic reasons, the
United States is less likely than ever before to use an extensive network of
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overseas bases. Sea-basing would allow for the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of both Marine Corps and Army forces at sea. Key components of this capability would include high-speed ships (thirty-five knots and
above), prepositioning at sea, and forward staging aboard ship. While existing
“large-deck” ships such as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships could
be reconfigured to support some “sea-basing” missions, entirely new (and very
large) ships may be needed to receive large intertheater airlift aircraft at sea. Use
of V-22 vertical-lift aircraft, new high-speed lighterage, and the enhanced capabilities of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle would provide the capability for forces ashore to be sustained for extended periods.
Continue Power Projection Focus. This option most closely resembles the Navy
of today. Its underlying assumption is that the primary battlefields of the future
will remain overseas. Investment in this area would focus on rapid application of
decisive force by augmenting the force with Tomahawk missile–armed cruisers
and long-range guided munitions aboard destroyers; dedicated platforms such
as high-speed vessels, cruise-missile-launching nuclear submarines, and nuclearpowered aircraft carriers armed with Joint Strike Fighters and unmanned combat air vehicles. Increased emphasis would be placed on supporting special
operations forces and Marine Corps expeditionary warfare forces. A power projection focus would provide decisive naval power to defeat adversaries anywhere
in the world.
Ensure Access for Other Forces. Additional investment in this area would focus
on increasing the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to gain access to geographic areas of national interest, both in “permissive” environments when U.S.
forces are welcome and in “forced-entry” scenarios in which opposing combat
forces must be overcome. This option assumes that the Navy will remain “forward deployed” in areas of potential conflict. Gaining and maintaining such
access, and providing the means for the sustainment of the force once ashore,
will require enhancements to the Navy’s capabilities in missile defense, mine
warfare, surface warfare, undersea warfare, air traffic control, ship routing, and
command and control. With this investment the Navy could ensure access to the
theater of conflict for our joint forces and allies. Fully capable multimission
ships teamed with capable littoral combat ships will be essential in this option.
Provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Nation. Properly
configured, naval forces could provide the nation with forward-deployed forces
focused on winning the information “battle of the first salvo.” The underlying
assumption of this option is the recognition that technological development
will provide the means for long-term surveillance of the theater of operations,
thus providing commanders with a “real-time” picture of emerging events. The
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sea-based portion of a larger theaterwide architecture would include conventional radars, acoustic and electronic sensors, and a futuristic expeditionary
sensor grid. It would employ sea-bottom sensing arrays, unmanned vehicles (air,
surface, and subsurface), ground systems, and the necessary networking and
processing capability. Defensive forces would protect and monitor the sensor
network, and offensive capabilities would be collocated to exploit information
and rapidly respond to threats using naval forces, including missiles, special
operations forces, Marines, and tactical aircraft.
Refine Homeland Defense. With this emphasis, a future Navy would enhance its
capabilities to provide missile defense of the United States, as well as of allies and
forces around the world. This option assumes that additional and substantial attacks on targets within the United States are likely, if not inevitable. The homelanddefense option would continue strategic deterrence through the use of ballistic
missile submarines and offensive counter-missile forces to disrupt enemy ballistic
and cruise-missile operations through offensive strikes. Additionally, a responsive
maritime security force would operate with the Coast Guard deepwater “national
fleet” to prevent the movement of hostile elements and weapons of mass destruction by sea. A Navy configured to support this mission would include a number of
small yet capable surface ships that would complement the patrol capabilities of
the Coast Guard. Unmanned air vehicles also hold great promise for cost-effective
surveillance of maritime corridors.
This is only a cursory look at these various options, and there is considerable
work yet to be done to refine each of the concepts. Our efforts continue to be
focused on bringing clarity to each issue to assist decision makers who must
make the hard calls about where limited resources will be applied to generate the
greatest return on the nation’s investment.
As I have noted in the past, the Naval War College has two primary missions:
to educate future leaders and to define future forces. Efforts such as the Navy
Vision Project are one way in which we bring the intellectual energy of our faculty,
staff, and students to bear on key issues of the day. Decisions made today will
shape the Navy for decades to come. We are glad to help make these decisions the
best that can be made.

RODNEY P. REMPT

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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